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Abst rac t - - In  this correspondence, a cryptanalysis onan access control in an hierarchy is proposed. 
We will show that Chang and Buehrer's scheme is impractical. 
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Recently, Chang and Buehrer [1] proposed an efficient method for access control in a hierarchy. 
In this correspondence, we will show that, in their scheme, any user who has the same direct 
ancestors will have the same secret key. Furthermore, a user cannot calculate correctly the keys 
of user classes which are below him in the hierarchy. Thus, their scheme is impractical. 
In their scheme, the secret key Ki of user Ui can be computed by the formula 
Ki  = K/o (ti) mod m and f ( t i )  = t~ mod m, 
where 
m: the product of a pair of large primes, 
/40: the secret key of the central authority, 
K~: the cryptographic key of user i, 
ti: the key information about user i, 
e: an integer, 
f(.): a one-way trapdoor function. 
In the formula mentioned above, only m and f(t~) are public parameters. 
According to Algorithm 1 of Chang and Buehrer's method, as shown in Figure 1, the key 
information ti of user i in Figure 2 will be as follows: 
t l  = r,  t4 : l cm (t2, t3), 
t2 = tl * P1, t5 = lcm (t2, t3), 
t3 = tl * P2, t6 : t3 * /°3, 
where P~ is the ith element of an array P[1 . . .  n] of coprime numbers. Therefore, user 4 and 
user 5 have the same cryptographic key according to Algorithm 1. 
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ALGORITHM 1. KEY GENERATION. 
Input: A directed acyclic graph G. 
Output: Public integers f(ti) and secret key Ki. 
Step 1: Compute the depth of each node of G. 
Step 2: Let {U1, U2,.. . ,  Un} be a list of nodes sorted in nonincreasing order according to 
their depths. 
Step 3: Assign any positive integer as the value tl of node U1. 
Step 4: Define an array P[1. . .  n] of coprime numbers, sorted in increasing order. 
Step 5: Let i = 1. 
StepC: For j=2ton  
If indegree(Uj) == 1, then 
{tj := tk * Pi; /* Here Uk is the parent of Uy , /  
i := i+ l  
} 
Else/* indegree(Uj) > 1 , /  
{S' := {ti I Vi is a direct ancestor of Vj}; 
tj := lcm (S'); 
} 
Compute the public integer f(t j )  by the formula 
f ( t j )  := t; mod 
Compute the secret key Kj for Uy by the formula 
Kj := K~;m°dm mod m 
Figure 1. Algorithm 1 in the original paper. 
Figure 2. Partially ordered set S of user class Ui. 
There is another problem with their scheme. The following example illustrates how the keys 
of descendant classes are calculated by Algorithm 1. 
EXAMPLE 1. Consider a hierarchy structure having 8 classes in it, as depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. The example in the original paper. 
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Let e=3,  r=2,  P1=2,  P2 =3,  P3=5,  P4=7,  Ps = l l ,  m= 13 .17=221,  K0 =3.  We 
have 
f(t~) 
f(t2) 
f(t3) 
f(t~) 
K1 
K2 
K3 
K4 
tl=r=2, 
t2 =t l *P1- - - -4 ,  
t3=t l *P2=6,  
t4 ---- t l  * P3 = 10, 
= 23 mod m = 8 mod 221 = 8, 
= 43 mod m = 64 mod 221 = 64, 
= 63 mod m = 216 mod 221 = 216, 
= 103 mod m = 1000 rood 221 = 116, 
= K0 f(tl) mod m = 3 s rood 221 = 152, 
= KYo (t2) mod m = 364 mod 221 = 120, 
= K0 f(t3) mod m = 3216 mod 221 = 118, 
= Kfo (t4) mod m = 3116 mod 221 = 217, 
t5 = lcm 
t6 ---- lcm 
t7 ---- t4 * 
ts = lcm 
f(t~) = 
f(t6) = 
f ( tr)  = 
(t2,t3) = 12, 
(t3, t4) = 30, 
/94 = 70, 
(t5, t6, t7) = 420, 
123 mod m -- 1728 mod 221 = 181, 
303 mod m = 27000 mod 221 -- 38, 
703 mod m = 343000 mod 221 = 8, 
f ( t s )  = 4203 mod m = 74088000 mod 221 = 181, 
K5 = Kfo (tb) mod m = 3 TM mod 221 = 107, 
K6 = Kfo (tS) mod m = 338 mod 221 = 100, 
K7 -- K0 f(tr) rood m = 38 mod 221 = 152, 
Ks  = K0/(ts) mod m = 3 TM mod 221 = 107. 
Now, according to A lgor i thm 2 of Chang and Buehrer 's  method,  as shown in F igure 4, we use 
the cryptographic  key of user 1 to calculate the key of user 6. Thus, we can compute 
D = [f(t l )1-1 mod m = 8 -1 mod 221 = 83, 
E = f ( t6 )*  D mod m = 38 .83  mod 221 = 60, and 
K6 = (K1) E mod m = 15260 mod 221 = 1. 
ALGORITHM 2: CALCULATING KEYS OF DESCENDANT CLASSES. 
Input:  Secret key Kj ,  public integers f ( t , ) ,  f ( t j ) .  
Output :  Secret key Ks. 
Step 1: D := [f(tj)] -1 mod m 
Step 2: E := f ( t i )  * D mod m 
Step 3: K i  := (Kj)  ~ mod m 
Figure 4. Algorithm 2 in the original paper. 
From Example  1, we can find that  the cryptographic key Ks is not the same as the one derived 
from Algor i thm 2. Thus, their scheme is impractical .  
Let us assume that  A lgor i thm 2 can succeed in discovering the secret key Ks. Then,  we have 
Ki = (Kj)  f(t')/f(t~)m°dm od m. (1) 
Because Ks = K0 y(`') rood m and K j  = Kfo (tj) mod m, we get 
K0 y`tl) : (Kfo(tJ') "f`t')/f(t~,m°drn modm.  (2) 
Therefore, we have 
if(t,) f ( t i )  = f ( t j )  mod m} mod A(m), 
\ f ( t j )  / 
(3) 
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where A(m) is the minimal universal exponent of m. According to Rosen [2], A(m) denotes the 
minimal exponent u such that 
gU _- 1 mod m, for all integers g relatively prime to m. 
On the other hand, if f ( t i )  and f ( t j )  cannot satisfy Congruence (3), then Congruence (2) is 
not correct. Thus, Congruence (1) cannot succeed. Therefore, if f ( t i )  and f ( t j )  cannot satisfy 
Congruence (3), then Algorithm 2 will fail. For instance, in the above example, f ( t l )  and f(tc) 
cannot satisfy Congruence (3) because 
(f(tc) m) f(tc) # f ( t l )  \f--~l) mod 
38 ¢ 8 * (60) mod 48. 
mod/~(m), 
Therefore, Algorithm 2 fails to f ind/(6. 
In this correspondence, we have shown that Chang and Buehrer's cheme for access control 
is impractical. In their scheme, any user who has the same direct ancestors will have the same 
cryptographic key. Furthermore, in some cases a user cannot correctly derive the cryptographic 
key of his descendant. 
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